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J. David Seay, JD.t
T HE CU RENT legal and public policy debate about the charita-ble status of voluntary not-for-profit hospitals, which most often
takes the form of challenges to tax-exempt status,1 can be viewed as
a debate about accountability. This debate takes on a heightened
urgency against the backdrop of a decade of continually rising
health care costs and the growing number of Americans with no
health insurance coverage. With a federal government paralyzed by
a lack of leadership on fundamental issues of national health policy,
and with politicians seized with the fervor of a free market and "pro
competition" ideology, now generally discredited by many observ-
ers, hospitals are being closely examined for the extent of their char-
itable services, with a particular emphasis on the provision of
uncompensated services to the poor. Furthermore, there appears to
be a growing fascination with the use of the tax code to solve na-
tional health care access problems.
t Mr. Seay is Vice President, Secretary, and Counsel of the United Hospital Fund of
New York, and adjunct faculty member of the Program in Health Services Management of
the Graduate School of Management and Urban Policy at the New School for Social
Research.
1. Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P. 2d 265 (Utah 1985). Medi-
cal Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc. v. Burlington, 566 A2d 1352 (Vt. 1989); Downtown Hosp. Ass'n v.
Tenn. State Bd. of Equalization, 760 S.W. 2d 954 (Tenn. App. 1988); St. Luke's Hosp. v. Bd.
of Assessment Appeals, No. 88-C-2691 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Lehigh Co., April 19, 1990). See also,
State v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., No. 494,212 (126th J. Dist. Travis Co., Tex., filed Nov. 26,
1990), In re HealthEast, Inc., No. 198801297 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Orph. Ct. Div., Lehigh Co., July
12, 1990). For a discussion of the Texas Attorney General's attack on the tax exemption of
Houston's Methodist Hospital, see Gary Taylor, Charity Begins in Court? Hospital Sued in
Novel Lawsuit, NAT'L L.., Feb. 18, 1991 at 3.
2. H.R. 790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1374, 102d Cong., ist Sess. (1991); U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NONPROFIT HOsPIrALs: BETTER STANDARDS NEEDED
FOR TAX EXEMPTION 27 (1990); Robert Pear, Bush's Plan and L.S. at Odds on Health
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In analyzing the positions taken by the various parties to this
debate, it is important that there be a clear understanding of what
the standards for tax-exemption are, and more importantly, why we
grant tax-exempt status in the first place. Only then will we be able
to determine whether tax policy is broken, and if so, how it should
be fixed.
In commenting on "The Future of Tax-Exemption for Non-
Profit Hospitals and Other Health Care Providers" by Professor
John D. Colombo and Professor Mark A. Hall, I will argue that as
important as public perceptions are, and as valued as outcomes of
institutional behavior might be, the standard for tax-exemption for
hospitals-community benefit-derives its criteria from expecta-
tions about organizational processes and how institutions are gov-
erned and managed.3 Further, I argue that the underlying policy
rationale and intent for granting tax-exempt status is to encourage
certain types of organizations and institutions rather than to stimu-
late, through indirect subsidy, specific and mathematically quantifi-
able solutions to identified social problems.
TWO OUT OF THREE
In the article, Colombo and Hall set out to do three things.
First, they seek to provide an overview of the background of the
hospital tax-exemption issue and to explain how it has become such
a front-burner issue on today's health care and tax policy scene. In
doing so, they also review current tax-exemption standards at the
state and federal levels, in an effort to set the groundwork for their
legislative analysis and policy argument.
Second, they strive to undertake a careful analysis of the two
legislative proposals recently submitted in the United States House
of Representatives by Congressmen Brian J. Donnelly of Massachu-
setts4 and Edward R. Roybal of California.' These bills, which seek
Care, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 1992 at Y14 (I.R.S. rulings on tax status of health maintenance
organizations clash with Bush Administration health reform policy).
3. J. David Seay, Community Benefit Prevails, HEALTH PROGRESS (Jan.-Feb. 1992); J.
David Seay, Hospitals' Predicament May Be all Non-profits', THE CHRON. OF PHILAN-
THROPY, Nov. 19, 1991 at 42,43; The Tax-Exempt Status of Hospitals, Hearings on H.R. 1374
Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of
J. David Seay), reprinted in Testimony of J. David Seay, Vice President, Secretary and Coun-
sel, United Hospital Fund of New York, Before the Committee on Ways and Means, United
States House of Representatives, July 19, 1991, 4 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 639-641 (1991)
[hereinafter The Tax-Exempt Status of Hospitals].
4. H.R. 1374, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
5. H.R. 790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). It should be noted that Congressmen Don-
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to set clearer standards by which hospitals are granted or allowed to
retain tax-exempt status for Federal income tax purposes, take dif-
ferent definitional and enforcement approaches to the issue. How-
ever, both rely upon a "relief of poverty" rationale for defining
charitable purpose.
Finally, Colombo and Hall argue again for their "donative the-
ory" or "market in altruism" rationale for tax-exemption.6
In commenting on the authors' success in achieving their objec-
tives, I suppose that two out of three is not bad. They are succinct
in their overview of the tax-exemption issue; detailed and rather en-
lightening in their legislative analysis, although I differ with them
on some of their analytic tools; but they offer disappointingly little
new insight when they conclude with their plea for their version of
Hansmann's "donative theory," which I refer to as the "popularity
contest" rationale for tax-exemption.
BACKGROUND: A MATTER OF EMPHASIS
In analyzing the Internal Revenue Service's treatment of hospi-
tal tax-exemption, Colombo and Hall curiously emphasize the "pro-
motion of health" portion of the clause contained in the 1969
Revenue Ruling 69-545 and almost entirely ignore the portion of
the clause in that same ruling that speaks to the "benefit of the gen-
eral community,". 7 This is important to note, for it is the language
that revives the centuries old "community benefit" standard, dating
back at least to the English Statute of Charitable Uses in 1601,8
later so brilliantly restated by Lord McNaughten in Pemsel's case,9
and quoted again more recently by Chief Justice Burger of the
United States Supreme Court in 1983.10
The most important concept behind the community benefit no-
tion, which apparently Colombo and Hall fail to see, is that hospi-
nelly and Roybal plan to retire at the end of the current term. Adam Clymer, Citing Rise in
Frustration, Dozens of Lawmakers Qui N.Y. TIMEs, April 5, 1992 at 1.
6. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospita.
Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WAsH. L. REv. 307-411 (1991); Mark A.
Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exception, 53 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 14-25 (1992); Mark A. Hall, Address at the New York Univ. School of Law (October
10-11, 1991).
7. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
8. An Act To Redress the Misemployment of Lands, Goods and Stocks of Money
Heretofore Given to Certain Charitable Uses (Statute of Charitable Uses), 1601, 43 Eliz. ch.
4.
9. Commissioners v. Pemsel, 1891 App. Cas. 531, 583 (H.L.).
10. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983).
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tals or other health care institutions, or for that matter any number
of other types of socially beneficial institutions, derive their ration-
ale for tax-exemption not from the promotion of health, or the pro-
motion of culture or music, or social welfare; but rather, and more
importantly, from providing socially desirable benefits in a particu-
lar way to the larger community as a whole.11 This assumes, of
course, that all of the other criteria regarding non-profit organiza-
tions are met, e.g. the "non-distribution constraint," incorporation
under a not-for-profit corporation law, and prohibitions against pri-
vate inurement, private benefit, involvement in political activities
and substantial lobbying efforts. 2
This distinction between "promotion of health" and providing
"community benefits" is important for purposes of this debate. If
we are to narrow the scope of the tax-exemption standard and be
more restrictive in the granting of tax-exempt status, as many argue
that we should, then we should be exacting and explicit in choosing
which of these two policy rationales we use in crafting new policy
and in drafting new tax legislation. By assuming the "promotion of
health" as the rationale for tax-exemption, Colombo and Hall are
inextricably driven to the conclusion that tax-exempt status for hos-
pitals must be awarded or denied on the basis of the extent to which
they provide free or uncompensated health care services to the poor.
To the contrary, the more historically consistent understanding
of the community benefit concept is that we provide tax-exempt sta-
tus to encourage institutions and organizations such as hospitals,
essentially voluntary in nature, which are governed and managed in
a manner beneficial to the community. 3 If the current laws are
deficient, as I believe they are, they are not so because they fail to
dictate specific outcome levels of charity care provision, but rather,
because they are not clear enough or do not go far enough in pro-
viding guidelines or criteria about the nature of these institutional
11. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; Carl T. Schramm, The Legal Identity of the
Modern Hospital: A Story of Evolving Values, in IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH: THE MIS-
SION OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 65-86 (J. David Seay & Bruce C.
Vladeck eds., 1988).
12. I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3); Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 283 (1945);
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. at 588.
13. Robert M. Sigmond, Address at Park Ridge Hospital, Rochester Area Hospital
Council, William B. Woods Memorial Lecture (October 22, 1981); Robert M. Sigmond, Ad-
dress at Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Center for Health Administra-
tion Studies Michael M. Davis Memorial Lecture (May 10, 1985); J. David Seay & Robert M.
Sigmond, Community Benefit Standards for Hospitals: Perceptions and Performance, FRON-
TIERS OF HEALTH SERVICES MGMT., Spr. 1989, at 3.
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governance and management processes to which these institutions
should be held more accountable.
THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
Colombo and Hall do a great service in their analysis of the leg-
islative proposals of Congressmen Donnelly and Roybal, to the ex-
tent that they point out in detail the quagmires of complexity into
which hospital trustees and managers, as well as IRS officials,
would be pushed were these proposals adopted. They are similarly
informative in pointing out the definitional differences between the
two bills with regard to what constitutes hospital charity care costs.
Furthermore, they correctly emphasize the need for intermediate
sanctions, short of revocation of exempt status, for those hospitals
failing to meet one or more of the criteria. Of course this begs the
question as to which standards should be employed in an effort to
firm-up the community benefit notion.
However, the authors are correct to note that there appears to
be a growing consensus that the operation of an emergency room
and the existence of a Medicaid provider agreement should be ad-
ded to the extant procedural or "process" criteria now employed for
tax-exemption. 14
However, in their commentary on the exemption standards, Co-
lombo and Hall use their "relief of government burden" or quid pro
quo theory as an analytic tool, particularly in their analysis of the
Roybal bill. I must comment that although the "relief of govern-
ment burden" theory is one of a number of policy rationales enunci-
ated over the years in the case law of tax-exemption, as
Guggenheimer has emphasized,"5 it is but one theory. It is also one
with serious empirical shortcomings with regard to the expectations
and the behavior of the American people.
For example, Colombo and Hall say that .. this theory posits
that exemption is warranted because, in the absence of the exemp-
tion, government would have to pay for services rendered by the ex-
empt entity" (emphasis added). 6 Although they argue that the
14. This was made clear repeatedly by witnesses testifying on July 10th, 1991, before the
Ways and Means Committee in its hearings on hospital tax-exempt status. See The Tax-
Exempt Status of Hospital; supra note 30.
15. Elizabeth M. Guggenheimer, Making the Case for Voluntary Health Care Institu-
tions: Policy Theories and Legal Approaches, in IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH, supra note
11, at 35.
16. John D. Colombo & Mark A. Hall, The Future of Tax Exemption for Nonprofit




provision of health services to those unable to pay would more
logically be accomplished by direct government subsidy than by in-
direct subsidy through tax-exemption, they nonetheless enthusiasti-
cally adopt the quid pro quo or "relief of government burden"
rationale essentially by asking the question: why shouldn't a hospi-
tal earn its tax-exemption? A fair question.
Regrettable as it is, health care is not a right in America, nor has
the government even enunciated its intention to assure the provision
of hospital services to each and every one of America's inhabitants.
If anything, the Federal government has been decreasing its direct
involvement in the operation of hospitals and the provision of
health service. The fewer voluntary hospitals there are will simply
mean fewer hospital services provided. There is no indication that
the government will pick up the slack. Empirically, at least, the
"relief of government burden" rationale is a poor analytic tool and a
slender reed at best.
The fault that the authors find with the Roybal bill is not that it
attempts to measure the wrong thing, which it does. In fact, it is
clear that they believe that charity care is the one true way to mea-
sure community benefit. Their problem with the proposal is that it
does not compare voluntary to for-profit-hospitals. Indeed they
quite logically observe that ". . .if exempt hospitals do not have
proportionately more uncompensated care than for-profit hospitals,
then the exempt hospitals in fact are not relieving any government
burden and do not deserve exemption under this theory."17 Again,
once one accepts as a premise the notion that the community benefit
theory requires as its measure the provision of uncompensated care
services to the poor, then theirs would be a logical result. I think
this is a false premise, and that the Roybal bill, along with Profes-
sors Colombo and Hall, are simply attempting to measure the
wrong thing.
Similar analytic tools are used to examine the Donnelly bill.
However, Columbo and Hall offer two enlightening observations.
First, they observe that about the only type of hospital which is sure
not to meet the tax-exemption test of the Donnelly bill are the spe-
cialty hospitals. These institutions, although exempt from the re-
quirement of operating an emergency room under the bill, would
not be exempt from the five-part alternative test for community
benefit."8 Since specialty hospitals are likely neither to have a dis-
17. See id. at 15.
18. In addition to having an emergency room open to all without regard to their ability
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proportionate number of low-income Medicare and Medicaid pa-
tients nor to fit the definition of sole community hospital under the
Medicare laws, and because these hospitals may not fall within the
one-standard-deviation test of the Donnelly bill, specialty hospitals
must achieve their tax-exempt status by either the 5% or 10% char-
ity care expenditure test. Since the 10% test relies upon outpatient
services, not often provided in great quantity by specialty institu-
tions, then these hospitals would almost certainly be left to face the
most rigorous of the five tests in order to retain or obtain tax-ex-
empt status. Surely the specialty hospitals, and perhaps Congress-
man Donnelly, owe Professors Colombo and Hall a debt of
gratitude for this important observation.
The second thing that the authors observe in analyzing the Don-
nelly bill is somewhat indirect. What they mean to be a criticism of
the bill, turns out to be a flaw in common both to the bill and to the
commentators' analysis, and in fact helps me make my point. Here
the authors criticize the second use of the disproportionate share
cost calculation in the Donnelly five-point alternative test. This cal-
culation exempts hospitals whose disproportionate share calculation
is no more than one standard deviation below the area-wide mean.
Colombo and Hall argue that because this alternative test is such a
large loophole, and in fact they cite an American Hospital Associa-
tion estimate that over three-quarters of non-profit hospitals would
pass this test, the actual rigor of the entire bill is really illusory and
that the net effect is to return right back to the status quo for most
hospitals; that is, the present fuzzy and il-defined community bene-
fit test. According to my analysis, this is not necessarily such a bad
thing; it gets us back to the central question of how to better under-
stand the community benefit concept. The Colombo and Hall cri-
tique of the Donnelly legislation, much like their analysis of the
Roybal bill, falls into the trap-as do Donnelly and Roybal them-
selves-of attempting to measure the wrong thing.
to pay, and having a provider agreement to treat Medicaid patients, in order to be tax-exempt
under the Donnelly bill, a nonprofit hospital must also meet at least one of the following five
alternative tests for community benefit: the hospital is (i) a sole community provider under
Medicare, (ii) serves a disproportionate number of Medicaid or poor Medicare patients, (iii)
carries a "disproportionate patient percentage" (according to the Medicare reimbursement
regulations) which is within one standard deviation of the mean for all of the hospitals in the
instant hospital's area, (iv) able to demonstrate that at least 5% of its gross revenues are
dedicated to charity care, or (v) able to demonstrate that at least 10% of its gross revenues
are dedicated to certain ambulatory care services in medically underserved areas. See supra
note 4; see also Thomas R. Barker, Reexamining the 501(c)(3) Exemption of Hospitals as




Two other areas applicable to both pieces of proposed legisla-
tion, where Colombo and Hall are particularly helpful, include clas-
sification and enforcement. With regard to classification, they point
out that both bills' penalties would affect the tax-exempt status not
only of the hospital failing the respective tests, but would also auto-
matically jeopardize the tax-exemption of any parent or sponsoring
entity which operates the hospital. This could provide obviously
serious, if unintended, consequences for colleges and universities. It
would almost certainly raise First Amendment concerns in in-
stances where the hospital in question is operated by a church or
other religious order. At the very least, these provisions require
scrutiny and reconsideration.
In analyzing the enforcement provisions of the proposed bills,
the authors note the excise tax penalty of the Roybal bill, and the
curiously unique requirement that amounts collected by the IRS
under the provision be paid over to the state in which the offending
hospital operates. They raise, but do not explore, the ramifications
of this novel approach.
Under the Donnelly bill, the authors note a continued reliance
upon the revocation of exemption as the principle method of en-
forcement, although they correctly point out a few modifications to
that concept. The authors' analysis reveals that the Donnelly bill,
unsure on which way to go, provides both for a two-year period
after which a hospital may be able to reclaim its tax-exempt status,
and upon some notions of a penalty tax that would generally equal
the difference between 10% of the hospital's gross revenues and the
amount of charity care provided by the hospital. Colombo and Hall
are correct in that it might be better to pick one or the other ap-
proach. Unfortunately, in my opinion, they select the wrong one in
that they suggest that excise tax provisions similar to those used for
private foundations be adopted as penalties under the section of the
Internal Revenue Code. 9 Under the governance or "process stan-
dard" approach, a better penalty might be one that provides offend-
ing hospitals with an identification of any deficiencies in their
processes to provide community benefit, and then provides a period
of time within which to cure the alleged deficiencies. Outright revo-
cation of exemption could be retained as a last-resort penalty.
THE POPULARITY CONTEST
In the policy analysis section of their article, Colombo and Hall
19. I.R.C. §§ 4940-4948.
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argue not for a charity care standard for hospital tax-exempt status,
but rather for their "market in altruism" approach. This notion is
really an interpretation of Hansmann's "donative theory" of
nonprofits.2°
This notion argues that the American public can "vote with
their feet" with respect to charitable organizations, and simply
choose not to give contributions to those organizations that do not
behave in a charitable fashion. In this manner organizations are, or
can be, charitable only to the extent that the public, or some portion
thereof, perceives them to be. This curious notion is neither an out-
comes measure-that is, one that looks to see how much of a partic-
ular good, such as charity care, a hospital actually provides-nor a
process based standard-that is, one that seeks to set the parame-
ters of the types of organizational structure, governance, and man-
agement which society desires to encourage. It borrows upon
Hansmann's notion of a dichotomy between those nonprofit organi-
zations which are commercial in nature, and hence not deserving of
tax-exempt favoritism, and those that are "donative" in nature, in
that they receive a substantial proportion of their revenues from
charitable contributions.2 1 Only these latter types are "true" chari-
ties and deserve the special treatment of tax exempt status. So, the
Colombo and Hall idea is nothing new. They simply take
Hansmann's theory to its logical conclusion, adding along the way
an arbitrary minimum amount-30%-of a hospital's revenues
which must be derived from donations in order to be deemed
charitable.
Even as they introduce this idea, the authors question whether
tax legislation is the best route to solving our nation's major health
policy concerns, e.g., access to health care services. To their credit,
Colombo and Hall answer this question in the negative and con-
clude that tax reform is at most a second-best alternative for funda-
mental reform of the way in which we attempt to provide access to
health care services to our nation's inhabitants. However, I think
the authors have reached this conclusion for entirely the wrong
reason.
The analysis used by Colombo and Hall in reaching this conclu-
sion relies principally upon viewing the tax-exemption phenomenon
as an intentional government subsidy of the private voluntary hospi-
tals to provide health care services to the poor. I would suggest that




this was not at all the reason why hospitals were exempt from taxa-
tion in the first place, nor is it a cogent reason for exempting them
now. Even though a tax-exemption undoubtedly has an effect simi-
lar to an indirect subsidy, that is not why hospitals were ex-
empted.22 As Swords has pointed out, hospitals were never
conceived of being in the tax base in the first place.2 3 Hospitals
were exempt from various taxes long before there was a personal
income tax24 in this country, and were of a class of institutions that
were deemed, but their voluntary formation and charitable nature,
to be outside the revenue and property base upon which taxes were
eventually applied. In this sense, Surrey's notion of a "tax-expendi-
ture"25 should have no applicability in the case of the voluntary
hospital.
In hearings before the Ways and Means Committee on July 10,
1991,26 many witnesses testified that Congressman Donnelly's legis-
lative proposal would not come close to solving the formidable
health care access problem in the United States. Congressman
Donnelly, clearly exasperated by this, repeatedly stated that this
was not the intention of his legislation. His bill was not meant to
force the voluntary hospital sector to do indirectly what the govern-
ment clearly has not been willing to do directly, that is, provide a
national health insurance mechanism. On the other hand, he said
that his bill was simply intended to provide better criteria for deter-
mining which hospitals should be exempt from taxation and which
ones should not.27 This is precisely what tax legislation in this area
should do, and not much more.
Tinkering with Federal tax policy and the Internal Revenue
Code cannot magically solve all of our social ills and shortcomings.
All-too-often the argument is made that hospitals should solve the
22. James J. McCormack, Hospital Strategy and Public Policy: Seeking the 'Just Right'
Balance, in IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH, supra note 11, at 117; Stanley B. Jones & Merlin
K. Du Val, What Distinguishes the Voluntary Hospital in an Increasingly Commercial Health
Care Environment? in IN SIcrcNEss AND IN HEALTH, supra note 11, at 201.
23. Peter Swords, testimony before the Committee on Ways and Means, N.Y. State As-
sembly (March 12, 1990); and CHARITABLE REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS IN NEW
YORK STATE (1981).
24. Rev. Act of 1894 (Act of August 15, 1894, Ch. 349, 28 Stat. 553). For a discussion
regarding the development of the federal charity exemption, see Kenneth Liles and Cynthia
Blum, Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Charities, 39 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROBs. 6 (1975).
25. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM, 34 (1973); STANLEY S. SUR-
REY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, 72-83 (1985).




health care access problem as a quid pro quo for their tax-exemp-
tion. It may be easier instead for hospitals to convert to for-profit
status, avoid the social expectations, and be subject to taxation.
They probably wouldn't pay any taxes if they did, given payment
reductions, the flexibility of generally accepted accounting prac-
tices, and the ingenuity of many hospital accountants, lawyers, and
consultants. As Vladeck has suggested, perhaps the tax returns of
the for-profit hospital chains over the past few years should be ex-
amined by way of enlightenment in this regard.28
As Congressman Donnelly has suggested, tax-exemption is a
threshold standard like most government standards. The criteria
used in determining which hospitals meet this threshold should be,
by their very nature, minimal tests. For those desiring higher stan-
dards and seeking to identify the very best hospitals, one should
look to the private sector with its long history of very high yet flexi-
ble certification and accreditation standards. In fact, as described
by Kovner and Hattis,29 there is an important national demonstra-
tion project being undertaken at this time to establish and test vol-
untary accreditation standards for the purpose of determining
community benefit among hospitals. But that is not what the tax-
exemption standards are all about, nor should they be.
MEASURING THE RIGHT THING
What is unique about voluntary organizations consists in their
governance and management, and in their very voluntariness.30
They are unique because they are structured in a way that is neither
wholly public nor wholly private. They are private in the sense that
they are governed by private individuals serving as trustees in estab-
lishing a mission for the organization and in attempting to effectu-
ate it over time, and because they are not creatures of government.31
On the other hand, the voluntary institutions are public in the
sense that the community benefit standard overlays a requirement,
which should be made more explicit today, that these institutions
affirmatively strive to assess community need, and to undertake
some objectively verifiable efforts to both meet those needs and to
28. Bruce C. Vladeck, "Taxing Logic," PRESIDENT'S LETTER, United Hosp. Fund
(April, 1991).
29. Anthony R. Kovner & Paul Hattis, "Benefitting Communities," HEALTH MGT. Q.
(Winter, 1990).
30. IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH, supra note 11; Seay & Sigmond, supra note 14.
31. Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp. and Dispensary, 79 N.J. 549, 557, 401, A. 2d, 533,
537 (1979); Guggenheimer, supra note 16.
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involve the community in those processes.32 Implicit also in such a
requirement is a concomitant reporting requirement by which such
institutions should disclose to the public all community benefit
processes and activities, and the resources available and allocated
towards such end.33
When added to the extant procedural requirements for tax-ex-
emption already mentioned, these requirements go beyond just a
more rigorous application of the IRS "organizational test,' 34 and
cross over into the "operational test ' 35 by setting observable opera-
tional criteria. But unlike outcome-mandate criteria, these stan-
dards would not tie the hands of hospital trustees and managers,
and thus devoluntarize the institution. To the contrary, these
would be more rigorous than current law, be consistent with the
procedural nature of present criteria, and would interpret the com-
munity benefit idea, as it should be, in a manner that both promotes
community service and preserves the fundamentally voluntary na-
ture of the institutions.
Both the "market in altruism" or "donative theory," which re-
sult in nothing more than a public popularity contest, and the "re-
lief of poverty" criterion, which dictates outcomes for governance
and management, amount to nothing more than substituted judg-
ment by lawmakers in place of the voluntary governors or trust-
ees. 36 Once this occurs, the institution ceases to be voluntary in
nature and loses it most essential attribute. In commenting on the
status of existing law, Colombo and Hall note that "... yet everyone
who now considers the issue, even the hospital industry, conceives
that something more is required. The debate really turns on what
that 'something else' is that hospitals should provide."' 37 With this I
wholeheartedly concur. However, the authors have just picked the
32. Seay and Sigmond, supra note 14.
33. Id.
34. Treas. Regs. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (b). See also I.R.S. Pub. 557 (1991).
35. Treas. Regs. § 1.501 (c) (3)-l (c) (1).
36. Although there may be weaknesses in the analogy, neither corporate law nor the
Securities Exchange Commission seek to guarantee that a business make a profit, nor do they
penalize them if they fail to do so. What those bodies of law do, however, is set some ground
rules along the way, about how we expect the game to be played and what sort of structures
and behaviors are and are not acceptable. Likewise, the rules for voluntary hospitals should
not seek to prescribe their outcomes or their successes, nor to guarantee that they produce a
certain result or penalize them through the tax code if they do not. Tax exemption criteria
simply ought to provide the framework within which they may operate-and further, en-
courage the types of structures, organizational forms, and behaviors which we perceive to be
beneficial to our communities.
37. See Colombo & Hall, supra note 16, at 31-32.
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wrong fork in the road. The direction I point to is toward the quali-
tative or "process" standards referred to above.3" The authors sug-
gest that such standards have no eye toward the actual outcomes
and that the approach would enmesh the Congress in a "metaphysi-
cal values debate" over the performance of the tax-exempt hospitals
in relation with others.
By way of response I suggest that there is very little metaphysi-
cal about process criteria. The sorts of questions these criteria
would ask are as follows: Does the hospital formally commit itself
to service for a designated community, by means of a mission state-
ment or other instrument? Has the hospital undertaken, either by
itself or in collaboration with others, a health care needs assessment
for the population within the designated community? Has the hos-
pital, either by itself or in conjunction with others, set specific com-
munity health improvement goals for this designated population?
Has the hospital developed-and annually reviewed and revised-a
specific community benefit plan to effectuate these activities includ-
ing any number of objectively demonstratable programs, such as
special initiatives for the poor and other underserved individuals?
Is there evidence in all of these hospital processes of community
input and involvement? Does the hospital take a leadership role in
pursuing community health objectives? Does the hospital regularly
report on its community benefit activities and divulge the financial
resources made available to do so? I would suggest that none of
these questions are metaphysical and that all of them are more eas-
ily answered than the calculus required by the mathematical formu-
lae proposed by Congressmen Donnelly or Roybal. They most
certainly will produce a result more rational and substantive than
one which would leave the metaphysical questions to Madison Ave-
nue, which is what surely would result if hospitals were put on no-
tice that it is their public image and popular perception which will
determine their tax status.
As Vladeck and I have pointed out, mission matters;39 however,
process matters too. A community-serving intent, when coupled
38. The only state so far to adopt legislation regarding the accountability of voluntary
hospitals as to their community service performance is New York, where precisely the sort of
process criteria for which I argue have been used. N.Y. State Pub. Health Law, 2803-1 (Mc-
Kinney 1991). The similarity of these criteria to those being developed by the Hospital Com-
munity Benefit Standards Program, and to those adopted by both the Catholic Health
Association and Voluntary Hospitals of America, may be the reflection of a trend toward a
fairly broad consensus on this issue.
39. 3. David Seay & Bruce C. Vladeck, "Mission Matters," in IN SICKNEsS AND IN
HEALTH, supra note 11, at 1, 22-34.
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with certain reasonable safeguards as to the organizational structure
or processes by which an organization is governed and managed,
should provide that better understanding of "community benefit"
that is so sorely needed in the current debate.
